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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, and pursuant to a conditional plea
agreement, James Edward Snapp, Jr., entered a guilty plea to felony trafficking in
methamphetamine and/or amphetamine.  Mr. Snapp appealed, asserting the district court erred
when it denied his motion to suppress.  Specifically, he asserted the search of the curtilage of his
residence, and the seizure (and resulting search) of the black bag containing methamphetamine
found in the curtilage, were unlawful.  Mr. Snapp asserted the open view doctrine did not cover
the officers’ warrantless search of the curtilage, the plain view exception to the warrant
requirement did not justify the seizure of the black bag, and Mr. Snapp did not abandon the black
bag.  (See App. Br., pp.8-22.)
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argued Mr. Snapp had not shown error in the denial of
the motion to suppress, because the officer’s entry onto Mr. Snapp’s property for the purpose of
seizing the black bag of methamphetamine he saw Mr. Snapp throw from his car was
constitutionally reasonable, and the officer’s search of the black bag Mr. Snapp abandoned did
not violate the Fourth Amendment.  (See Resp. Br., pp.4-14.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s arguments, which are unavailing.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Snapp’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.  Mr. Snapp would further note that, although the
incident at issue here took place at night (see R., p.55), and the officers spent about five to ten
minutes searching the area around Mr. Snapp’s residence before locating the black bag (see
2R.,  p.57),  the  State  mentioned  neither  one  of  those  facts  in  its  Respondent’s  Brief.   (See Resp.
Br., pp.1-2, 4-14.)
3ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Snapp’s motion to suppress?
4ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Snapp’s Motion To Suppress
A. Introduction
Mr. Snapp asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress, because
the search of the curtilage of his residence, and the seizure (and resulting search) of the black
bag, were unlawful.  The open view doctrine did not cover the officers’ warrantless search of the
curtilage of Mr. Snapp’s residence, because the officers did not restrict their movements to
places where ordinary visitors could be expected to go.  The plain view exception to the warrant
requirement did not justify the seizure of the black bag, because it was not immediately apparent
the black bag was contraband or evidence of a particular crime.  Mr. Snapp did not abandon the
black bag, because he threw it onto his own private property and did not disclaim ownership.
Thus, the warrantless searches and seizure here were unlawful, and the evidence obtained
thereby should have been suppressed.
B. The Open View Doctrine Did Not Cover The Search Of The Curtilage, Because The
Officers Did Not Restrict Their Movements To Places Where Ordinary Visitors Could Be
Expected To Go
Mr. Snapp asserts the open view doctrine did not cover the officer’s warrantless search of
the curtilage of his residence, because the officers did not restrict their movements to places
where ordinary visitors could be expected to go. See State v. Christensen, 131 Idaho 143, 147
(1998); State v. Hiebert, 156 Idaho 637, 643 (Ct. App. 2014).  Because no exception to the
warrant requirement applied, the warrantless search of the curtilage was unlawful. See
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991); State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 295 (1988).
51. The Search Of The Curtilage Was A Substantial And Unreasonable Departure
From The Normal Access Routes
The search of the curtilage of Mr. Snapp’s residence was a substantial and unreasonable
departure from the normal access routes.   The State argues that,  “[a]lthough Officer Jones was
not on the pathway to the home when he seized the bag of methamphetamine, his movements
were restricted to the area where the bag was thrown, and his departure from the pathway was
neither substantial nor unreasonable.”  (Resp. Br., pp.7-8.)  The State bases its argument on
Corporal Jones seeing Mr. Snapp throw an object from his car, and searching for it with other
officers in an area one to ten feet from the house.  (See Resp. Br., p.7.)
However, the State has neglected to mention that Corporal Jones did not find the black
bag until he and the other officers had searched Mr. Snapp’s yard for five to ten minutes.  (See
R., pp.56-57.)  The State also did not mention that the officers’ search of the curtilage occurred
around midnight.  (See R., pp.55-57.)  Contrary to what the State suggests, ordinary visitors
would not be expected to spend five to ten minutes, around midnight, trawling for evidence right
next to a private residence. See Christensen, 131 Idaho at 147; see also Florida v. Jardines, 569
U.S. 1, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 & 1416 n.4 (2013) (“[N]o one is impliedly invited to enter the
protected premises of the home to do nothing but conduct a search.”); State v. Cada, 129 Idaho
224, 233 (Ct. App. 1996) (“[A] late night government intrusion onto the driveway of a home
without a warrant may also be prohibited although a similar approach in the daytime would
not be.”).
Thus, the search of the curtilage of Mr. Snapp’s residence late at night by several officers,
culminating in the officers locating an item one foot from the residence, was a substantial and
unreasonable departure from the normal access routes. See Hiebert, 156 Idaho at 644.  The open
6view doctrine did not cover the officers’ warrantless search of the curtilage of Mr. Snapp’s
residence. See Christensen, 131 Idaho at 147; Hiebert, 156 Idaho at 643.
2. The  State  Has  Failed  To  Show  An  Exception  To  The  Warrant  Requirement
Justified The Warrantless Search Of The Curtilage
Because the open view doctrine did not cover the warrantless search of the curtilage, the
officers’ intrusion implicated Mr. Snapp’s constitutional privacy protections. See State v. Webb,
130 Idaho 462, 465 (1997).  Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, and the State
has the burden of proof to show a warrantless search fell within one of the well-recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement. See State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 486 (2007).  Here, the
State has failed to show an exception to the warrant requirement justified the warrantless search
of the curtilage of Mr. Snapp’s residence.
The State argues Mr. Snapp’s conduct “invited Officer Jones to move beyond the implied
invitation to normal access routes,” because “Officer Jones had probable cause to believe
[Mr.] Snapp violated the law.  Specifically, Officer Jones had probable cause to believe
[Mr.] Snapp was in possession of contraband and that he was trying to conceal that evidence
when  he  threw  it  from  his  car  after  Officer  Jones  attempted  to  stop  him.”   (Resp.  Br.,  pp.8-9
(alternation and internal quotation marks omitted).)  In other words, the State contends that even
if the open view doctrine did not apply and the officers’ intrusion implicated Mr. Snapp’s
constitutional privacy protections, probable cause justified the warrantless search of
the curtilage.
However, this contention by the State ignores the United States Supreme Court’s holding
that it regards “the area ‘immediately surrounding and associating with the home’—what our
cases call the curtilage—as ‘part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.’” See
7Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1414 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180
(1984)).  The United States Supreme Court has also held that “police officers need either a
warrant or probable cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful entry into a
home.” Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
590 (1980)); see also State v. Rigoulot, 123 Idaho 267, 272 (Ct. App. 1992) (“It has been held
that absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless search of one’s home or its curtilage, when
effected through trespass, violates Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”).
Here, the State has not argued that exigent circumstances existed to justify the officers’
warrantless search of the curtilage.  (See Resp. Br., pp.8-9.)  The State attempts to draw parallels
between the instant case and State v. Jenkins, 143 Idaho 918 (2007) (see Resp. Br., pp.8-9), but
Jenkins is readily distinguishable because it is a “hot pursuit” case.  In Jenkins, the police
received a report the defendant had committed a battery, and tried to stop the defendant as he
pulled into his driveway. Jenkins, 143 Idaho at 919.  The defendant instead drove into his
garage, where the officers stopped him. Id.  On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held the
officers had probable cause to believe the defendant had committed a felony, and acted on
probable cause to arrest in a public place. Id. at 922.  As the State discussed (see Resp. Br., p.8),
the Jenkins Court held the defendant “could not thwart the arrest, validly initiated upon probable
cause in his driveway, by fleeing inside.” Jenkins, 143 Idaho at 922 (citing United States v.
Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976)).
However, the State did not quote the next sentence in Jenkins (see Resp. Br., pp.8-9),
where the Court concluded, “[a]s in Santana, ‘[t]he fact that the pursuit here ended almost as
soon as it began did not render it any the less a “hot pursuit” sufficient to justify the warrantless
8entry into [the suspect’s] house.’” Jenkins, 143 Idaho at 922 (quoting Santana, 427 U.S. at 43).
In another decision, the Idaho Supreme Court characterized Santana as holding “the entry into
the  defendant’s  home  to  complete  the  arrest  was  justified  by  an  exigent  circumstance:  the
officers’ ‘hot pursuit’ of a fleeing felon.” State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817, 822 (2004) (quoting
Santana, 427 U.S. at 42-43).
In this case, Mr. Snapp was handcuffed and placed in custody shortly after
Corporal Jones made his initial contact, before he and the other officers began their search of the
curtilage.  (See R., pp.56-57.)  Thus, unlike the defendant in Santana, see 427 U.S. at 43,
Mr. Snapp was not in a position to create a realistic expectation that any delay would result in
destruction of evidence. See also State v. Wren, 115 Idaho 618, 625 (Ct. App. 1989) (“[A]
warrantless arrest within the home cannot be justified upon hot pursuit alone.  The facts also
must reveal one of the exigent circumstances enumerated above—an imminent danger to person
or property, a likelihood that evidence will be lost or destroyed, or a probability that the suspect
will escape while a warrant is being obtained”).  Additionally, nothing on the record here
indicated Mr. Snapp was armed or dangerous to the officers. Cf. Warden, Md. Penitentiary v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967) (holding a warrantless search of a house was reasonable,
where the officers were searching for an armed robbery suspect who had reportedly entered the
house five minutes before the officers arrived, and for weapons the suspect might have used in
the  robbery  or  use  against  the  officers).   Thus,  the  hot  pursuit  exigent  circumstance  does  not
apply here. Jenkins, being a hot pursuit case, is readily distinguishable from the instant case.
The State has not argued that, alongside any probable cause there might have been, hot
pursuit or any other exigent circumstance appeared in this case to justify the warrantless search
of the curtilage.  (See Resp. Br., pp.8-9.)  Any future argument by the State on exigent
9circumstances should therefore be disregarded by this Court. See State v. Almarez, 154 Idaho
584, 598-99 (2013).  Without demonstrating the combination of probable cause plus exigent
circumstances existed here, the State’s argument that probable cause justified the warrantless
search fails. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1414; Kirk, 536 U.S. at 638.
Additionally, the State’s argument that probable cause justified the warrantless search of
the curtilage fails because Corporal Jones simply did not have probable cause at the time he
began the search.  The Idaho Supreme Court has held, “[p]robable cause is established when the
totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the search would give rise—in
the mind of a reasonable person—to a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place.” State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706 (2012).  “Probable cause
is a flexible, common-sense standard, and a practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating
evidence is present is all that is required.” Id.
At the time Corporal Jones started the search of the curtilage, he knew that Mr. Snapp’s
vehicle had committed traffic violations, the vehicle did not immediately yield when the corporal
activated his overhead lights to initiate a traffic stop, Mr. Snapp tossed a dark-colored item
towards the residence, and Mr. Snapp denied throwing anything towards the residence.  (See
R., pp.55-57.)   In the mind of a reasonable person, the totality of the circumstances above would
not have given rise to a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in
the curtilage of Mr. Snapp’s residence. See Anderson, 154 Idaho at 706.  The district court did
not find Corporal Jones had observed any drug activity, or any incriminating activity beyond the
traffic violations, at or before the time of the search.  (See R., pp.55-57.)  The district court also
did not find Corporal Jones knew Mr. Snapp had previously been arrested on or charged for drug
10
offenses.  (See R., pp.55-57.)  Corporal Jones did not have probable cause at the time he began
the search.
In the course of its probable cause argument, the State also compares this case to State v.
Loman, 153 Idaho 573, 576 (Ct. App. 2012).  (Resp. Br., p.9.)  However, as the State
acknowledges (see Resp. Br., p.9), Loman involved a defendant’s evasive actions creating
probable cause to justify a search under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
See Loman, 153 Idaho at 576.  Under the automobile exception, law enforcement officers having
probable cause to believe an automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime may search
the automobile without a warrant. E.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).  The
United States Supreme Court has held a primary ground for the automobile exception is the
reduced expectation of privacy one has in an automobile. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386,
392 (1985).  The Carney Court held, “[a]utomobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive
and continuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection and licensing
requirements.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In contrast, the United States Supreme Court has held the curtilage or “area around the
home is ‘intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically,’ and is where
‘privacy exceptions are most heightened.’” Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1415
(quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)).  Because this case involves the
warrantless search of the curtilage of Mr. Snapp’s residence, and not the search of an automobile,
the State’s comparison with Loman is  inapt.   The  State  has  failed  to  show an  exception  to  the
warrant requirement justified the warrantless search of the curtilage of Mr. Snapp’s residence.
Because the officers did not restrict their movements to places ordinary visitors could be
expected to go, the open view doctrine did not cover their search of the curtilage of Mr. Snapp’s
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residence. See Christensen, 131 Idaho at 147; Hiebert, 156 Idaho at 643.  Thus, the officers’
intrusion implicated Mr. Snapp’s constitutional privacy protections. See Webb, 130 Idaho at
465.  Despite the State’s unavailing arguments, no exception to the warrant requirement applied,
and the warrantless search of the curtilage was unlawful. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580;
Henderson, 114 Idaho at 295.
C. The  Plain  View  Exception  Did  Not  Justify  The  Seizure  Of  The  Black  Bag,  Because  It
Was Not Immediately Apparent The Black Bag Was Contraband Or Evidence Of A
Particular Crime
Even  if  the  open  view  doctrine  covered  the  search  of  the  curtilage  of  Mr.  Snapp’s
residence, or an exception to the warrant requirement justified the warrantless search of the
curtilage, Mr. Snapp asserts the plain view exception to the warrant requirement did not justify
the seizure of the black bag.  It was not immediately apparent the black bag was contraband or
evidence of a particular crime. See State v. Ruck, 155 Idaho 475, 482 (2013).
1. Mr. Snapp Did Not Abandon The Black Bag
Mr. Snapp asserts he has standing to challenge the seizure (and resulting search) of the
black bag, because he did not abandon it.  Mr. Snapp did not disclaim ownership, and he threw it
onto his own private property.
The State argues Mr. Snapp “abandoned his black bag of methamphetamine by throwing
it out the window of his car and subsequently denying that he did so because his words and
actions indicate that he ‘voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished’ any interest
in the bag.”  (Resp. Br., p.10.)  However, the State has neglected to mention the fact that
Mr. Snapp never told Corporal Jones or the other officers that the black bag did not belong to
him.   (See R., pp.55-57.)  Because he merely threw the black bag and denied he threw it,
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Mr. Snapp’s words, acts and other objective facts did not indicate he relinquished any interest in
the black bag. See State v. Melling, 160 Idaho 209, 211-12 (Ct. App. 2016).
The State also attempts to wrestle with the fact that Mr. Snapp threw the black bag onto
his own private property.  The State presents a straw man argument that Mr. Snapp has asserted
“one cannot abandon a piece of personal property so long as the personal property rests on real
property one does not abandon.”  (See Resp. Br., p.11.)  However, Mr. Snapp acknowledged the
Idaho Supreme Court in State v. McCall, 135 Idaho 885, 887 (2001), declined to address whether
the garbage cans at issue were within the curtilage of the defendant’s property, because the
defendant had obviously waived his expectation of privacy when he placed his garbage out for
collection, no matter whether the garbage cans were technically within the curtilage or not.
(App. Br., p.17.)  Mr. Snapp actually asserted, “in situations where the expectation of privacy
was not so obviously waived, courts in some other jurisdictions have indicated one cannot
abandon an item on one’s own private property.”  (App. Br., p.17.)
The  State  next  tries  to  invoke State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 396 P.3d 700
(2017), for the proposition that “[t]he Court should decline to consider this argument because it
is not preserved since [Mr.] Snapp never claimed in district court that ‘one cannot abandon an
item on one’s own property.’”  (See Resp. Br., pp.11-12.)  However, Garcia-Rodriguez is  not
applicable here.  In Garcia-Rodriguez, a case where the State argued the Idaho Supreme Court
should apply a legal analysis the State had not raised before the district court, the Court declined
“to adopt a ‘wrong result-wrong theory’ approach to reverse a lower court’s decision based on
issues neither raised nor argued below.” See Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho at ___, 396 P.3d at
704-05.  The Court held that, “[b]ecause the constitutionality of arresting Garcia-Rodriguez
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without regard for Idaho Code section 49-1407(1) was not argued before the district court, it is
not properly before this Court on appeal.” Id. at ___, 396 P.3d at 705.
In contrast, the district court here addressed the issue of whether Mr. Snapp abandoned
the black bag, determining that “because Snapp denied tossing the bag out of the door, he
thereby denied ownership of the bag.  By doing so, Snapp relinquished any reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding the contents of the bag.”  (See R., p.63.)  Thus, even though the
parties did not raise the issue of abandonment before the district court (see generally R., pp.33-
34, 37-41, 43-48; Tr., p.50, L.20 – p.64, L.25), the district court decided Mr. Snapp had
abandoned the black bag (see R., p.63).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held an exception to the rule that issues cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal “has been applied by this Court when the issue was argued to or
decided by the trial court.” State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998).  Because the district
court directly addressed the abandonment issue in this case (see R., p.63), DuValt, not Garcia-
Rodriguez, is applicable.  Thus, this Court may decide the abandonment issue on appeal. See
DuValt, 131 Idaho at 553.
Additionally, the State attempts to distinguish this case from the cases from other
jurisdictions cited by Mr. Snapp.  (See Resp. Br., pp.12-14.)  The State argues Work v. United
States, 243 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1957), does not support Mr. Snapp’s argument because his
“abandonment was not the product of ‘illegal police conduct.’”  (Resp. Br., p.12.)  The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Work held the defendant sought to
hide a phial containing pills as a result of the officers’ warrantless unlawful entry into her home.
See Work, 243 F.2d at 661-62.
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However, the Work Court also held the phial had not been abandoned. Id. at 662-63.
The State’s argument regarding Work fails, because the Work Court did not base its
abandonment holding on the officers’ illegal conduct, but rather on the phial being found within
the curtilage of the defendant’s house, in a trash receptacle under the house’s porch or stoop. See
id. at 662-63.  The Work Court held, “[i]n the alleged circumstances of this case there could not
be said to be an abandonment even to [the trashmen]; there was, rather, a hiding.” Id. at 663.
The State next contends State v. Reed, 641 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007), does not
support Mr. Snapp’s argument because Corporal Jones, unlike the officer in Reed, “did not
surreptitiously remove the black bag from Snapp’s property or force Snapp’s abandonment of the
bag.”  (See Resp. Br., pp.12-13.)  In Reed, detectives seeking a DNA sample furtively removed a
cigarette butt from the curtilage of the defendant’s house by kicking it off the patio. See Reed,
641 S.E.3d at 323.  The cigarette butt had not been placed for pickup by a collection service. Id.
at 322.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Reed held the detective’s action did not defeat
the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 323.  But the Reed Court also held that
“the trial court relied on the abandoned property exception to defendant’s Fourth Amendment
protections.  Because we believe that the facts of the present case fall well outside this exception,
we decline to apply it in this case.” Id.  The Reed Court continued: “[F]or abandonment to
occur, the discarding of property must occur in a public place; one simply cannot abandon
property within the curtilage of one’s own home.” Id.
Further, the State argues Brown v. State, 540 A.2d 143 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988), does
not support Mr. Snapp’s argument because, “[u]nlike in Brown,  where  the  defendant  secretly
sought to dispose of his drugs in an enclosed backyard, [Mr.] Snapp threw his bag of drugs while
15
Officer Jones was pursuing him, and then denied doing so.”  (See Resp. Br., pp.13-14.)
However, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in Brown did not focus on the defendant’s
secrecy when it decided whether the defendant had abandoned his Fourth Amendment property
interest in the drugs. See Brown, 540 A.2d at 150.
Rather, the Court in Brown stated it had “a conceptual difficulty in accepting the State’s
argument that Brown ‘abandoned’ his property, no matter how bizarre his behavior may have
been, when the property alleged to have been abandoned remained physically located in an area
where he not only retained dominion but also had a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id.  The
Brown Court  also  quoted  a  case  from  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  Maryland  (the  highest  court  in
Maryland), which discussed how “in Hobson v. United States, 226 F.2d 890 (8th Cir. 1955), cited
with approval and followed by this Court in Beale v. State, [230 Md. 182, 186 A.2d 213 (1962)],
the discard of a package of narcotics into the backyard (a  part  of  the  curtilage) of a dwelling
house was held not to be an abandonment.” Id. (quoting Everhart v. State, 337 A.2d 110 (1975))
(alteration and emphasis in original).
Thus, Work, Reed, and Brown support Mr. Snapp’s assertions.  Those cases indicate that
in situations where the expectation of privacy was not obviously waived, one cannot abandon an
item on one’s own private property.  Here, Mr. Snapp did not obviously waive his expectation of
privacy; nothing on the record indicates he left the bag out for collection as garbage. Cf. McCall,
135 Idaho at 887 (“[T]he determining factor in this case centers around McCall’s obvious waiver
of  his  expectation  of  privacy  that  occurred  when  McCall’s  garbage  was  placed  out  for
collection.”).  Mr. Snapp did not abandon the black bag.
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Despite the State’s arguments to the contrary, Mr. Snapp did not abandon the black bag,
because he did not disclaim ownership, and he threw it onto his own private property.  Thus, he
has standing to challenge the seizure, and the resulting search, of the black bag.
2. The Plain View Exception Did Not Justify The Seizure Of The Black Bag
Mr. Snapp asserts the plain view exception to the warrant requirement did not justify the
seizure of the black bag, because it was not immediately apparent the black bag was contraband
or evidence of a particular crime. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993); Ruck,
155 Idaho at 482; Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 155-56 (2008).
In the Respondent’s Brief, the State has not argued that the plain view exception to the
warrant requirement justified the seizure of the black bag.  (See Resp. Br., pp.9-14.)  Any future
argument by the State on the plain view exception to the warrant requirement should therefore be
disregarded by this Court. See Almarez, 154 Idaho at 598-99.
Because it was not immediately apparent the black bag was contraband or evidence of a
particular crime, the plain view exception to the warrant requirement did not justify the seizure
of the black bag. See Ruck, 155 Idaho at 482.  Because no exception to the warrant requirement
applied, the warrantless seizure of the black bag, and the resulting warrantless search of it, were
unlawful. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580; Henderson, 114 Idaho at 295.
The district court erred when it denied Mr. Snapp’s motion to suppress, because the
search of the curtilage of his residence, and the seizure (and resulting search) of the black bag,
were unlawful.  The district court should have suppressed the evidence obtained from the
warrantless searches and seizure.
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CONCLUSION
For  the  above  reasons,  as  well  as  the  reasons  contained  in  the  Appellant’s  Brief,
Mr. Snapp respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order denying his
motion to suppress, vacate the district court’s judgment and commitment, and remand the case to
the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 24th day of August, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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